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Abstract Sustainable post-disaster recovery implies
learning from past experience in order to prevent recreating
forms of vulnerability. Memory construction supports both
the healing process and redevelopment plans. Hence,
memory of disaster results from the balance between
remembering, forgetting, and absencing elements of the
disaster, and can be both a tool and an obstacle to sus-
tainable recovery. We explore here how collective memory
is built in a post-disaster context to respond to the needs of
this critical period, and how it shapes recovery. This
ethnographic study, conducted between 2015 and 2017,
explores the recovery processes in Montserrat, a small
Caribbean island affected by an extended volcanic crisis
from 1995 to 2010. Although this study does not give
tangible solutions for disaster risk reduction in a post-dis-
aster context, it highlights potential obstacles for learning
from a disaster and how they may be surmounted. We
argue that it is crucial to acknowledge evolving collective
memory in order to implement effective measures for
preserving and sharing a shared understanding of disaster
across generations and social groups in a way that supports
disaster risk awareness. We also maintain that acknowl-
edging the dilemma faced by authorities and disaster
management agencies during a period of conflicting needs
may encourage the reconsideration of risk framing, and
hence reveal how to improve implementation of disaster
risk reduction measures.
Keywords Absencing risk information  Disaster
remembering  Forgetting processes  Montserrat  Post-
disaster recovery
1 Introduction
While post-disaster recovery processes result from strate-
gies informed by risk perceptions and visions of the future,
they are strongly influenced by experience and memory of
disaster. Remembering a disaster also goes hand in hand
with the process of forgetting about it. Acknowledging the
now well-recognized fact that disasters are largely a social
construct (Mileti 1999; Wisner et al. 2004; Kelman 2020),
this article explores the idea that there is much more that
can be learned from what is forgotten after a disaster. More
than being just elements that are not worth remembering
from the disaster, they can be the result of an active
exercise, combining strategies for absencing, or silencing
some elements of the past, present, and future. This can be
a response to some specific needs, conscious or
unconscious.
Although studies on memory following a crisis tend to
focus on individual memories and their association with
trauma (Kevers et al. 2016) and on memorialization (Le
Blanc 2012), little attention has been given to the role of
the process of remembering, forgetting, and absencing in
the post-disaster context and on its influence on the
recovery process. Yet this period is critical for imple-
menting strategies and processes that can increase the long-
term sustainable development of communities, even in the
face of further hazardous events. However, this long-term
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strategy needs to be balanced with the need for quick
response (Olshansky et al. 2012) to the socioeconomic and
physical damages linked to the disaster, which makes long-
term perspectives on decision making very challenging
(Monteil et al. 2020). In the context of disaster risk, the
processes of remembering and forgetting contribute to
individual and institutional strategies implemented to pre-
pare for future risks and learn from past disasters. Impor-
tantly, forgotten elements can re-emerge involuntarily
when reminders arise and can impact future actions, neg-
atively or positively (Oliver-Smith et al. 2016).
This study contributes to our understanding of how
experiential learning is absorbed by populations at risk and
how this impacts on future actions. This study, instead of
analyzing the state of collective memory in a post-disaster
context, aims to examine the conscious and unconscious
strategies implemented during the post-disaster recovery
process and examine how they appear to shape collective
memory, in order to explore how preparedness measures
might be improved during recovery. We analyze the
institutional strategies for forgetting risks implemented
during a post-disaster period, and explore how this for-
getfulness shapes recovery processes and their sustain-
ability. We argue that while silencing the risk of disaster is
part of a strategy to support some dimensions of the
recovery process, it can prevent sustainable recovery by
hindering the learning process.
The study is illustrated by the recovery process in
Montserrat, a small Caribbean island affected by an
extended volcanic crisis from 1995 to 2010. We first
review the current understanding of the recovery process
and of the role of remembering and forgetting in this
context. We then analyze them in the context of Montserrat
and demonstrate how active forgetting efforts impede
learning from disaster. This study brings some original
aspects to the field of disaster risk science we exploring the
topic through remembering, forgetting, and absencing. We
approach the recovery of Montserrat from a new and lon-
gitudinal perspective, an aspect lacking in much work that
covers this volcanic eruption (and many other disasters)
from social science perspectives.
2 Post-disaster Recovery: Creating Collective
Memory in Order to Move Forward
While the direct experience of a disaster becomes part of
the history of those affected, the way it is translated into
memory can be highly variable. In the long term, the
memory of the disaster is what remains from the disaster
and is thought to create risk awareness in those who have
been previously affected. Several studies have explored
how disasters were materialized in order to create a
collective memory (Le Blanc 2012). It is the collective
dimension of these representations that is particularly
important as it contributes to the shaping of power rela-
tionships and institutional decisions (Halbwachs 1950).
These are critical to long-term development, as much as
collective memory is constructed by these decisions. Yet as
Le Blanc (2012) suggested, the link between risk percep-
tion and memory of disaster is not straightforward. To
appreciate this complexity, it is crucial to understand what
memory is and what the processes of remembering and
forgetting are.
2.1 Remembering the Experience of Disaster
Halbwachs (1950) was the first to explicitly conceptualize
collective (also called cultural) memory. In particular, he
argued that individual memories are inherently shaped,
often also triggered, by the sociocultural context. More
recently, Erll and Nunning (2008, p. 2) defined cultural
memory as ‘‘the interplay of present and past in socio-
cultural contexts.’’ They underlined that although society
does not literally remember, the process implemented to
reconstruct a shared past is similar to the one implemented
for individual memory. They emphasized that the under-
standing of cultural memory should be multidisciplinary
and involves social, medial, and cognitive processes, and
their continuous interactions. The field has recently
expanded into personal trauma after a crisis such as war
(Suleiman 2012; Isakson and Jurkovic 2013; Kevers et al.
2016). The critical finding from these works is that memory
is a social construction (Conway 2003). Erll and Nunning
(2008, p. 7) explain that ‘‘the past is not given, but must be
continuously re-constructed and re-presented.’’ Sociolo-
gists claim that representations of the past are maintained
through specific social practices, and are created by the
interactions between people in a specific societal context
(Conway 2003; Connerton 2010). Therefore, the memory
of an identical event can be very variable depending on the
individuals, groups, or/and periods. Legg (2007, p. 459)
summarizes: ‘‘collective memory is a narrative that
excludes rival interpretations and is thus haunted by the
potential to remember differently or to refuse to forget.’’
Similarly this narrative can be used as a tool for empow-
ering or silencing groups in differing social contexts
(Jackson 2002), and so what is remembered can shift with
the conscious or unconscious objectives of those sharing, in
ways that may not directly relate to the factual context.
Although the concept of memory remains quite contro-
versial, as some scholars argue that it is too vague and
broad (Conway 2003), it nonetheless largely contributes
towards an explanation of the construction of identity
(Conway 2003) and of post-disaster recovery.
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2.2 The Role of Forgetting in Memory
By its very nature, the process of remembering induces a
selection and implies that elements of our past are forgotten
in the meantime. Suleiman (2012) points out that forgetting
is an active agent in the formation of memory. Halbwachs
and Coser (1992) first brought up the idea by stating that
remembrances often aim to meet some specific needs.
Implicitly, it means that some elements are voluntarily
pushed away as they do not correspond to these objectives.
Halbwachs and Coser (1992, p. 51) argue that ‘‘the mind
reconstructs its memory under the pressure of the society,’’
forgetting the constraints of the past as they no longer
operate, and adapting the memory to the framework of
present. Memory helps to shape the vision of the present
and the desires for the future, but is also shaped by them at
the same time (Halbwachs and Coser 1992; Hamer 1994);
this interactive process leads to diverse and evolving
memories. Academic literature has recently started to
address the forgetting process through research on selective
remembering (Hoelscher and Alderman 2004; Legg 2007;
Johnson 2012; Muzaini 2015).
The process of active forgetting has been explored
through different disciplines, in particular psychology
(Hardt et al. 2013), neuroscience (Singer and Conway
2008), and social anthropology. Connerton (2008) distin-
guished seven types of forgetting that play different func-
tions and that are implemented by different types of agents.
They include: (1) repressive erasure, as a condemnation of
memory with or without violence; (2) prescriptive forget-
ting, seen as beneficial for all parties involved; (3) for-
getting that is constitutive in the formation of a new
identity; (4) structural amnesia; (5) forgetting as annulment
because of the surfeit of information; (6) forgetting as
planned obsolescence; and (7) forgetting as humiliated
silence. Singer and Conway (2008) stressed that this
approach neglects the difference between availability and
accessibility of memory. They highlighted that they ‘‘prefer
to talk about the concept of relative degrees of accessibility
than to speak in terms of information being truly lost or
forgotten’’ (Singer and Conway 2008, p. 280). In this cri-
tique, there is the idea that there is no proper forgetting,
and what is forgotten can actually be revived through some
specific reminders. Yet some measures can also be
implemented to decrease the degree of accessibility of the
information and hence encourage their forgetting. We refer
to this as ‘‘absencing.’’
A few studies have focused on the role of silencing or
absencing information in order to forget it. Muzaini (2015,
p. 102) argues that forgetting involves ‘‘active embodied,
material and spatial practices of producing absences.’’ He
distinguishes three ways of supporting individual forget-
ting: conspiring silences, enacting absences, and
embodying avoidance. Conspiring silences refers to the
avoidance of talk about the past in order to prevent its
impact on the present. Enacting absences corresponds to
the fact of hiding or rearranging some elements of the past
in order to manipulate the material world and manage
troubling memories. Finally, embodying avoidance high-
lights the strategy of avoiding certain places to avoid
unwanted reminders. More specifically, Bickerstaff and
Simmons (2009) and Parkhill et al. (2010) explore how the
practice of absencing the risk of disaster in daily life
enables living in close physical proximity with techno-
logical risk. This practice supports an apparent acceptance
of the risk. It can contribute to forgetting the risk in daily
life, or more generally to transforming the risk perception.
Parkhill et al. (2010), however, stress that acceptance of
and familiarity with risk is transitory and can change dra-
matically under the influence of some reminders. Although
it is explained differently, the studies of Parkill et al. (2010)
and Bickerstaff and Simmons (2009) converge with Singer
and Conway (2008) in the sense that although there is not a
proper forgetting of the risk, individuals decrease their risk
perception by absencing it, and hence by lowering the
access to information about risks. In the context of
everyday risk calculations, it may be that individuals do not
perceive some natural hazards as a potential risk, as they
are relatively less important on that timescale. Although it
diminishes anxiety level in daily life, it can impact decision
making for individual and societal long-term development
where preparedness for the impacts of occasional haz-
ardous events becomes more important. This ‘‘absencing’’
of lower frequency events can be driven by a lack of direct
experience, by an active drive to minimize those risks, or
by subconscious processes of forgetting the severity of
outcomes or consequence.
Although different practices enable individuals to push
away risks and to forget elements of the past, reminders of
various shapes can create memory returns (Bickerstaff and
Simmons 2009; McEwen et al. 2017). Muzaini (2015,
p. 105) explains that ‘‘memory returns can be incited when
that silence is broken, when what was hidden is found or
when one encounters what one has learnt to avoid.’’
Absencing information or facts is therefore not enough to
totally forget (Muzaini 2015). In terms of risk perception,
direct (for example, witnessing a natural hazard) and
indirect experiences (for example, information from others,
education, and media) play a major role in recalling pre-
vious disaster and hence presence the risks again
(Wachinger et al. 2013). Through their study on perception
of nuclear risk, Bickerstaff and Simmons (2009, p. 868)
argue that ‘‘risks […] nonetheless retain a lingering (if
fleeting) presence and a capacity to return. We see pre-
cisely these themes of haunting and return in the findings of
other local studies of risk experience, which hint at the
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potential for exploring the ghostly remains and reminders
of past presences—both places and times—which mediate
personal and collective relations with risk.’’ Reminders
point out that memory is continually transforming. What
appears as forgotten at some point of time can re-emerge
later under the pressure of reminders.
3 Methodology and Case Study
In order to address the role of remembering and forgetting
risks in the post-disaster recovery process, we have
explored the memory construction process in Montserrat, a
British overseas territory located in the Caribbean (Fig. 1).
3.1 Case Study
The study was conducted in Montserrat, whose population
was severely affected by a prolonged volcanic eruption
from 1995 to 2010. The first eruption occurred only six
years after Hurricane Hugo, which devastated about 90%
of the island’s infrastructure. The Soufrie`re Hills volcano,
located in the south of the country, became active after
several centuries of dormancy. Since 1996, the southern
two-thirds of the country have been totally evacuated and
remain an exclusion zone. Pyroclastic flows and lahars
emanating from the volcano destroyed the capital city,
Plymouth, and most of the island’s major infrastructure.
The last significant activity occurred in 2010, but the vol-
cano is still active with a low level of risk of eruption (SAC
2013). The island is also exposed to a range of other natural
hazards, including hurricanes, droughts, tsunamis, land-
slides, and earthquakes. The island is divided into different
zones defined by the level of risk. Most of the previously
occupied areas are in the exclusion zone (zone V), with the
exception of a few villages in the western side of
Montserrat, which are accessible by day (zone C), and are
now under consideration for reoccupation. Zones A and B
are still occupied and now fully accessible (Montserrat
Volcano Observatory and Disaster Management Coordi-
nation Agency 2014) (Fig. 2).
In addition to the complete displacement of the popu-
lation, Montserrat has been subject to major demographic,
sociocultural, and economic change during and after the
volcanic eruptions. The population decreased from about
10,300 in 1995 to 2700 in 1998, and finally stabilized
around 4500 since 2001, due to rapid and intense immi-
gration of labor from neighboring countries. The rapidity
and extent of the post-disaster change perpetuates the sense
of disturbance caused by the disaster and affects the
recovery trajectory. It also implies that experiences of
disaster are both direct, for local policymakers and most
Montserratians, and indirect for new immigrants and
younger people.
At the time of the study, there were no immediate plans
for reoccupation of the south of Montserrat, but some areas
closer to the volcano had been declared safe for general
occupation, although amenities (electricity, water, and so
on) were not being restored. Since 2015, a few private and
collective initiatives were taken to reoccupy some of these
areas, including the restoration of some houses, the
development of farms and an annual festival gathering of
the former residents. Two major industries, sand mining
and geothermal activities, are also actively occupying areas
formerly evacuated.
3.2 Research Design
This research analyzes the post-disaster recovery processes
in Montserrat, using an ethnographic-based approach. In
addition to a review of academic and grey literature, the
research includes ethnographic observation with detailed
field notes, in-depth semistructured and informal inter-
views and four focus group discussions (FGD). All data
were collected in Montserrat. A total of 130 interviews
were conducted between 2015 and 2017 with government
officers, risk management institutions, private entrepre-
neurs, and residents from the four main nationality
groups—Montserratians, Guyanese, Jamaicans, and
Dominicans (Table 1).
The interviews were conducted in English or in Spanish
and lasted between 20 min and 1.5 h. The FGD were
conducted with Montserratians, Guyanese, and Jamaicans
in English and lasted about 1.5 h. Data collection was
conducted by an outsider, a white female researcher, and
interpreted in the light of this possible bias. All data were
anonymized. Qualitative data were then coded in NVivo,
using thematic and theoretical codes, in order to be ana-
lyzed. The main findings of the study were presented on
four occasions during public presentations, both in
Montserrat and in the office of the Montserratian govern-
ment in London, as an opportunity to discuss the findings
and open a dialogue with decision makers and residents of
the country.
4 Findings and Discussion
The research data show that 15 years of eruption have left
society on Montserrat with a very ambiguous relationship
with risks and disaster. While the 15 years of eruptions
have become part of the Montserratian identity and history,
the need to psychologically recover and move forward
from the disaster leads to a reliance on memory for disaster
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preparedness and an absencing of risk in daily life. That
process highlights the contradiction faced during the post-
disaster recovery process and the challenges for learning
from the disaster in order to reduce people’s vulnerability.
4.1 Memory Building Shaped by the Recovery
Narratives
The post-disaster recovery period is dedicated to rebuilding
what has been altered by the disaster, better than before,
while addressing long-term needs of sustainable develop-
ment. This includes the need to address the root causes of
vulnerability to disaster by learning from previous experi-
ences (Lo´pez-Carresi 2013). Hence the role of memory
building is twofold. On the one hand, it acts as coping
strategy to face the trauma of the disaster, and on the other,
it supports a narrative that shapes the development trajec-
tory of the affected place (Mika and Kelman 2019).
Yet, several studies have highlighted that there is no
straightforward link between risk awareness, experience,
and preparedness (Wachinger and Renn 2010; Wachinger
et al. 2013). This means that the experience of a disaster is
not sufficient to encourage better preparedness measures or
better awareness of risks, hence disaster exposure cannot
be considered as a sufficient learning process to reduce
vulnerability. The way memory is built, and especially
what is forgotten, determines a lot of the resulting long-
term, transgenerational perception of disaster and risks.
Memory construction faces two specific challenges: (1)
keeping communities risk-aware and risk-informed while
not generating knowledge fatigue; and (2) the balancing
low probability possible hazards with shorter time-scale
imperatives to regenerate the island.
Through the analysis of the recovery processes in
Montserrat following 15 years of eruptions, we highlight
major drivers of memory construction. The interviews
conducted between 2015 and 2017 reveal how memory is
built, and in particular expose some contrasting perceptions
related to the level of awareness and knowledge of risk of
disaster linked to volcanic hazards.
4.1.1 Assumed Memory and Knowledge
Memory construction in post-disaster contexts is a rela-
tively new concern (Convery et al. 2014; Pfefferbaum et al.
2007). Like in most places, in Montserrat memory con-
struction is hardly a dimension of the recovery process that
is thought about. Interviews with policymakers and disaster
management agencies’ officers demonstrate that memory is
considered as an inherent component of the recovery pro-
cess, although officials recognize that some actions can
play a reminding role and hence contribute to build a
Fig. 1 Montserrat (inset) and its position within the wider Caribbean region. Source: Wilkinson (2015)
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memory. Overall, the experience of the disaster is mostly
considered as sufficient to build memory of disaster, with
little consideration for the elements of risk and disaster that
are either absenced or more naturally forgotten. Disaster
managers even explained during interviews that they faced
difficulties in addressing the risk of disaster with the resi-
dents of Montserrat, despite the importance of the disaster
in the Montserratian identity and recent history. By con-
trast, people are generally happy to talk about their mem-
ory of the disaster, but more reluctant to tolerate facing the
same situation again. Such difference may express dis-
comfort and anxiety regarding the ongoing risks and the
attitude needed to face them. Although policymakers admit
doubts about what people actually know, the way they
address memory construction is mainly led by a collective
need for stability and certainty about the future. There is
therefore a collective effort to anchor the disaster in the
past that takes little or no consideration of the potential
implications for post-disaster learning.
When asked about the level of preparedness of the res-
idents of Montserrat, three disaster managers of the two
main disaster risk reduction (DRR) organizations and
almost all policymakers first argued that residents
remember enough from their experience of the disaster to
be able to prepare for another disaster. Regarding their
level of knowledge of ash falls, a senior policymaker
explained in May 2016:
Fig. 2 Montserrat Hazard Level System Zones. Zones A and B are
fully accessible. Zones C and F are accessible during daytime only.
Zone V is fully restricted except for essential workers. Zones E and W
are maritime zones, respectively with restricted access to essential
workers and daytime access. Source: Montserrat Volcano Observa-
tory and Disaster Management Coordination Agency (2014)
Table 1 Interviews conducted between 2014 and 2017 in Montserrat. The members of risk management, social/health institutions, and business
people (categories 2, 3, 4) were both Montserratians and non-Montserratians
Institutions/groups Total number of
interviews
Formal
interviews
(number)
Informal
interviews
(number)
Women Men Age range
(estimation)
1 Government officers (British and
Montserratian government)
21 21 9 12 30–60
2 Risk management/monitoring institutions
(DMCA, MVO, Red Cross)
10 10 5 5 30–60
3 Social/Health/Educational institutions (like
social services, schools, churches)
16 16 12 4 30–65
4 Business people 5 5 2 3 25–55
5 Montserratians 20 8 12 7 13 20–75
6 Guyanese 14 8 6 8 6 15–65
7 Jamaicans 14 6 8 6 8 20–65
8 Dominicans (DR) 12 7 5 5 7 45–70
9 Other nationalities 18 3 15 4 14 30–60
Total 130 84 46 58 72
Interviewee nationality was not specifically asked for in the interview as these individuals were interviewed because of their particular task and
job. The interviewees in categories 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 were specifically chosen because of the national group with which they identify
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Anybody who has been here for more than 10, for
more than five years, six years, knows about the
ashing. So they know that, and that’s probably the
most likely thing that can happen [for] the volcano in
the next little while, we can get some ashing of that
sort again.
Implicitly, the interviewees addressed the case of Montser-
ratians and immigrants who have lived on the island for a
long time. Among the evidence that policymakers present
to certify people’s awareness of volcanic risk, there is the
collective narrative stating that Montserratians are all ‘‘a bit
of volcanologist’’ because of their extensive knowledge of
scientific vocabulary and volcanic processes. Moreover,
reminders such as the volcano, the smell of sulphur, and the
presence of an exclusion zone, are also considered as
sufficient to preserve the memory of disaster. In January
2016, a disaster manager explained that people living close
to the exclusion zone are fully aware of the risk of disaster,
‘‘considering that they are in that area, they are constantly
reminded of it.’’
Yet, important nuances emerged when disaster man-
agers and policymakers were asked more specifically about
the sufficiency of memory and experience to make the
population aware about risks. Initially, they did not make
experiential or demographic distinctions in their statements
about knowledge, preparedness, and action relating to
volcanic risk.
Policymaker: ‘‘They know, they know. People abso-
lutely know that [the volcano] can explode any time.’’
Interviewer: ‘‘Do you think that non-national people
also know?’’
Policymaker: ‘‘Well, I hope so... but that’s a very
good question. That’s a very, very good question.
[…] because if you have not been through it, you
don’t know what the consequences are.’’ (Interview
with a policymaker in May 2016)
Similarly, a teacher affirmed in February 2016 that youths
were not able to relate to a film clip on the volcanic
disaster. These two people highlight the variations in
memory between different social groups. Youths who were
born during or after the disaster, and immigrants who did
not experience the evacuation, do not share the same
memory of the catastrophe. They also do not have the same
emotional relationship with the disaster and the predisaster
status of the island.
These testimonies emphasize the fluidity of memory
among the whole population (Halbwachs and Coser 1992;
Connerton 2010). Memory differs among the different
social and age groups, depending on their needs to move
forward and recover economically and psychologically.
When local authorities disproportionately represent a
particular demographic group (Montserratian with direct
experience of the eruption), however, these different
memories are not taken into consideration. Although pre-
vious work has shown the complex role of experience on
risk awareness and decisions to act for preparedness
(Wachinger et al. 2013), policymakers continue to rely on
memory for preparedness to disaster during the recovery
period.
4.1.2 Why Rely on Memory for Preparedness and Post-
Disaster Learning?
Questioning memory construction implies challenging
multiple post-disaster recovery needs, which all have dif-
ferent degrees of emergency (Olshansky et al. 2012) that
can often conflict with each other. This study highlights
how the prioritization of recovery objectives is conducted
in the context of exposure to several natural hazards and
uncertainty of risk of disaster. In Montserrat, the way
memory construction is approached is determined on the
one hand by the need for stability resulting from the crisis
trauma, and on the other, by the risk uncertainty and
unfinished status of the crisis. This highlights the consid-
erable challenges in balancing risk awareness against
knowledge fatigue while simultaneously mitigating low
probability hazards and regenerating the island.
4.1.2.1 Need for Stable Psychological, Economic, Demo-
graphic, and Social Recovery The risk of disaster linked
to volcanic hazards highlights the persistence of uncer-
tainties regarding the future, and hence the need to take
adequate measures to prepare. Yet a sense of safety and
stability is needed to provide residents and policymakers
with the ability to plan their development by consciously
learning from the volcano disaster and taking into consid-
eration the continuing risks. In Montserrat, the need for
stability and sense of control following the disaster con-
tributes to risk absencing as a strategy to cope with the
fatigue and trauma of the disaster. Interviews with
Montserratians and policymakers reveal that the population
remains strongly affected by the changes from 15 years of
crisis and displacement of 75% of the population to loca-
tions off the island. On several occasions, current inhabi-
tants mention during their interviews the fatigue induced
by lack of stability, as well as their need to regain a sense
of control, both for psychological and economic purposes.
When asked what she would do if there was another
eruption, a woman angrily said in 2017: ‘‘we can’t [deal
with an eruption again], we had too much.’’
Such reaction was very common through the discussions
with Montserratians. During an interview in May 2016, a
policymaker highlighted the dilemma authorities face when
it comes to disaster preparedness: ‘‘[the people] don’t want
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to hear anything about [the volcanic risk] because they’ve
been exhausted about [it].’’ Ignoring risks is a way to
protect the society and the individual against unmanage-
able anxiety and preserve ontological security, that is, a
sense of stability and order in people’s life (Giddens 1990;
Bickerstaff and Simmons 2009). This occurs even though it
means not adopting preparedness measures to reduce vul-
nerability to disaster. The anxiety overload contributes to
building a collective memory where the disaster is
anchored in the past, with little consideration of the role it
could have for longer-term planning, including DRR.
Although the risk of disaster remains present, it faces
competing priorities that favor a sense of stability and
economic boosts instead of preparedness and awareness
raising. The conflicting needs contribute to explaining the
challenges faced by efforts to learn lessons from the dis-
aster and better implement disaster risk reduction
measures.
In addition to the need for psychological recovery,
absencing the risk of disaster is presented at a political
level as a collective strategy to encourage investors, tour-
ists, and immigrants to settle in Montserrat. A tour orga-
nizer, not specialized in volcano tours, explained in 2017
during an interview how decision makers aimed to dis-
suade her from too much focus on the volcano as a tourist
attraction. She said the government did not want
Montserrat being perceived as a risky place. This was
confirmed during several interviews with policymakers in
charge of tourism and several influential Montserratians,
although all support efforts to memorializing the eruptions
and the destroyed town of Plymouth. Several informants
argued that tourists should also see the newly developed
areas. In the same way, policymakers are reluctant to speak
about the risk of disaster as they face pressure to reinvest in
the exposed areas for various economic activities like
tourism, sand mining, and geothermal energy production.
These activities are crucial for the economy, but also for
the legitimacy of elected people in their capacity to lead the
recovery process. Memory is therefore built in an effort to
rebuild a collective identity when the disaster is anchored
in the past and where the future is stable.
Preparedness measures for volcanic hazards, that is, the
consideration of risk of disaster, are regularly seen as
controversial as they affect the Montserrat government’s
short-term economic objectives. For instance, in 2015, the
government decided to temporarily extend the exclusion
zone because of signs of increasing activity. This decision
was met with large disagreement, in particular from the
workers who lost income during that period due to the
temporary closure of the quarries. The implementation of
an exclusion zone and the displacement of the population
to the north of Montserrat contribute to absencing the risk,
by limiting it to a specific area that is uninhabited, although
used for various activities. It enables the population,
including policymakers, to feel safe, and removes the need
for additional measures.
[Scientists] all say with reasonable certainty […]
we’ve seen the worst of it in terms of the scale of
what it can do and such are the plans in place and the
hazard zone system that it should never again, pro-
vided everybody observe those procedures […] that’s
the volcano again should never be a threat to life.
Everybody is now in the safe area. (A policymaker
during a radio talk, in June 2017)
4.1.2.2 Risk Uncertainty Considering its psychological
and social costs, efforts to build memory with the objective
of preparedness to natural hazards are mainly justified by
some level of risk certainty. In a post-disaster context, the
perception of risk certainty may itself be influenced by the
level of trauma and the level of psychological recovery of
the affected population (Wachinger and Renn 2010).
In Montserrat, the way risk certainty affects prepared-
ness measures is well illustrated by the comparison
between risks associated with hurricanes and volcanic
hazards. Although hurricanes do not affect Montserrat
every year, there is a high level of certainty about their
occurrence in the Caribbean region. Policymakers and
disaster managers explain during interviews that each year,
the preparedness period starts from February and they
successfully mobilize all ranges of actors, from govern-
ments to churches and disaster management agencies. In
contrast, since the last eruption in 2010, volcanic hazards
present much more uncertainty regarding their occurrence.
Although scientists and disaster managers regularly remind
the residents that the volcano remains active, this discourse
is confronted with the perception that volcanic risk is part
of the past and not a concern for the future. Hence, pre-
paredness measures for volcanic hazards do not appear as a
priority, and very little is implemented other than the
maintenance of an exclusion zone. A senior policymaker
emphasized during a radio program in June 2017 the dif-
ficulties of implementing suitable measures: ‘‘Nobody can
have an adequate plan for volcanic eruption because it’s…
the last one in Montserrat before this one was about
300 years ago and each eruption, each volcano is very
different.’’ He highlights not only the uncertainty in terms
of the timing and possibility of occurrence but also the
uncertainty in terms of efficiency of measures for disaster
risk reduction.
The need for preparedness, and hence talks about vol-
canic risk, is also challenged by the strong desire to move
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forward rather than to remain in a state of perpetual
readiness. That includes, for instance, reinvestment in some
areas that were evacuated in 1997 - 1998 by the devel-
opment of touristic and residential infrastructures. A poli-
cymaker also highlighted in January 2017 that people do
not fear a potential eruption anymore, and the only active
deterrent to going to the exclusion zone is the fear of
sanctions. Residents, even well-informed people and law
enforcement officials, provided evidence for this view by
their own admission of incursions by night to the exclusion
zone for fishing or hunting. Disaster managers also proved
to be aware of the challenges of that position. One declared
in January 2016: ‘‘people would like to think that the
volcano is a past problem. Now they want to start some-
thing new.’’ Here, the uncertainty of risk, in a context of
trauma and fatigue, encourages the ‘‘absencing’’ of risk.
This implies that memory construction is not led by the
need to learn from the disaster and to prepare to volcanic
risk, but mainly by the need to psychologically recover and
to build a post-disaster identity. This strategy carries with it
the risk of forgetting crucial knowledge learnt by experi-
ence that could be useful to cope with the impacts of future
hazards.
4.2 How is the Long-Term Recovery Process
Affected?
The way memory is constructed may have major implica-
tions for the long-term recovery process in the sense that it
affects both the risk communication strategies and the
economic and physical development initiatives.
4.2.1 Interrupted Transfer of Knowledge
The post-disaster recovery process, as a long-term process,
is accompanied by demographic change. In Montserrat, it
is marked both by the natural ageing of the population and
by migration. In 2016, the population was estimated to be
composed of about 50% immigrants, compared to 10% in
1990 (before the eruption). Immigration intensified from
1998, once the evacuation process was over, as the country
needed to compensate for the emigration of 75% of the
population. Demographic changes gradually led to a for-
getting process (Connerton 2008), with the disaster being
part of the past history of only a small part of the residents
of Montserrat. As a result, a large proportion of residents
have only a little, or no, experience of the eruption. Either
because they were too young, because they were not born,
or because they moved to Montserrat later, more than half
of the residents of the island do not share the memory of
the disaster. While sitting in a cafe´ that exhibits photos of
the eruptions, we discussed the images with a group of five
teenagers from different social groups (including two
Montserratians). Although they knew the general history,
they had difficulties identifying in each photo what exactly
could have happened and the extent of the hazards linked to
the eruptions. In addition, they showed many signs of
boredom and disinterest during that discussion. A Domini-
can woman also told me that although she knew that an
eruption destroyed some villages, she had never gone to see
the volcano and did not know the extent of the damaged
area. This not only challenges the argument often expres-
sed by policymakers during interviews that all residents
remember the disaster, but this assumption also prevents
the implementation of respectful and effective new ways of
memorialization and efforts to support experience and
knowledge transfers among the population.
The forgetting process is important given that little is
done to transfer the memory of disaster from those who
experienced the disaster to those who did not. Interviews
show that the population believes that the responsibility to
communicate about risk is on specific institutions, that is,
disaster management agencies and governments. Yet at the
time of the study, communication efforts related to risks
linked to volcanic hazards are not prioritized by disaster
management agencies and policymakers, other than the
Montserrat Volcano Observatory. Between 2015 and 2017,
several policymakers and disaster managers expressed
doubts during interviews about the efficiency of risk
communication efforts to reach the immigrant groups, in
particular those who do not speak English. Although a
large range of leaflets and a few radio programs have been
translated into at least some of the languages spoken in the
country, namely Spanish and Haitian, there has not been
any assessment of their effectiveness in non-English
speaking communities. Staff of two disaster management
agencies explained during two interviews that although
they created these leaflets, they have no certainty that
people have read them, understand them, or even are aware
of them.
Preparation for volcanic hazards is not a national pri-
ority, as the country faces more short-term and less
uncertain risks. It is compounded by the fact that the vol-
canic eruption is not yet declared over officially but at the
same time it is fully situated in the past by the population.
Moreover, it also depends on the trust of the people in
authority and in disaster management agencies. Scientists
expressed concerns during an interview in 2016 about their
credibility and capacity to maintain trust with the popula-
tion, especially if no volcanic hazard occurs for a long
period. In this context, memory is more vulnerable to
forgetting and fading as demographic changes prevent
stories being passed from one generation to another and
from the original residents to the newcomers. Although the
memorialization of the disaster mainly tends to anchor it in
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the past, there is a need to communicate about the per-
sisting risks.
Returning memory, however, can play an important, but
time-limited, role in preventing total forgetting of, and
failure in learning from, disaster. Reminders regularly
contribute to relaunch discussion and concern about the
risk of disaster linked to volcanic hazards. For instance, a
spontaneous increase in public comments in the street and
online about the volcanic risk occurred when the smell of
sulphur spread over the island because of particular wind
conditions. In 2018, the publication of an article in the
Guardian (UK) about the persisting risk of an eruption also
reopened important questions and fears in the society,
pushing volcanologists to clarify the level of risk (Ravil-
ious 2018). The effects of these reminders are short-lived,
however, and might become less and less important as time
passes without major volcanic events. A volcanologist
interviewed in 2016 explained that if people understand
that the smell of sulphur is not linked to an increase of
activity, it will gradually lose its reminder effect.
These observations raise important questions about the
way risk and preparedness measures are discussed.
Although the risk is an ongoing and changing phenomenon,
it should perhaps be important to flag important events that
should trigger preparedness campaigns or an increase in
efforts to raise awareness. These communication activities
should more carefully reflect the frequency and fluctuations
in interest and should respond to the changing character-
istics of the population.
In a context of ongoing risk, relying on collective
memory of disaster that mainly aims to anchor the disaster
in the past and to cope with the trauma prevents risk
communication measures adapting to post-disaster chan-
ges, including demographic ones. The longevity of the
crisis, with the persisting anxiety linked to risk, encourages
forgetting efforts among society, enabling people to deal
with anxiety and crisis fatigue. The challenge here is to
preserve knowledge of emergency preparedness for long-
term development, learnt during the past disaster, without
raising anxiety for the short-term future.
4.2.2 Gradual Reconstruction of Memory for a Sense
of Stability
Memory itself is not static and gradually evolves to follow
specific needs and social pressures (Halbwachs and Coser
1992). It evolves for individuals and groups, being shaped
by new realities and new needs. Because individuals cannot
remember everything, information and data naturally fade
away as time passes and as they seem irrelevant or useless
(Muzaini 2015). There is therefore a risk that crucial
knowledge, learnt from the experience of disaster, is
altered or even forgotten.
This evolution is mainly visible through the gradual
narrative changes when describing disaster. For instance,
the ash falls that occurred during the volcanic crisis are
generally described as very scary events because visibility
was extremely limited. However, when interviewees are
asked about the risks of reinvesting in the south,
Montserratians tend to consider ash falls as something
more annoying than dangerous. They mention the need to
clean away the ash, but do not express worries about the
danger of it. We can wonder if the change of narrative that
people have for volcanic risk is conscious and corresponds
to the absencing of the biggest constraints associated with
the hazard as it belongs to the past (Halbwachs and Coser
1992). Indeed, by normalizing the risk and making it
controllable, it seems to allow people to move on from the
disaster and take action for redevelopment.
The forgetting process is also translated through the
increasing pressure for reinvesting in the areas that were
evacuated but not totally destroyed. Several policymakers
explained that they face a growing pressure, especially
from the older population who have a strong attachment to
the abandoned lands, to reinvest in them as the volcanic
activity remains quiet. In 2017, for the first time, a group of
Montserratians led by a strong sense of nostalgia, orga-
nized a reunion of all the former inhabitants of Cork Hill, a
village evacuated in 1997. This event is particularly sym-
bolic as it gathered both Montserratians who have
remained on the island and Montserratians who have left.
The diaspora especially maintains a very emotional rela-
tionship with the lost areas, with more difficulties in
defining memories of Montserrat by its new features. Soon
after this reunion, the Premier publicly commented in the
Budget Statement (Romeo 2017):
The work of the Cork Hill Reunion Committee in
organizing the reunion […] was an inspiration. […]
Therefore Cabinet has recently approved granting
exemption from Import Duty and Consumption Tax
for three years on all building materials imported
specifically to repair or build any structure located in
those villages of Cork Hill, Delvin’s, Foxes Bay,
Weekes’s and Richmond Hill from the 1st of July.
This will give direct support to those people who
want to rebuild their homes and regenerate these
important areas. The initiative will encourage sig-
nificant construction activity in the private sector.
Although these areas are quite safe from volcanic haz-
ards and their reinvestment would not considerably
increase the vulnerability of the population to volcanic
hazards, it testified to an evolution of mentality where the
fear of volcanic hazards determines the decision making
less and less. Collective memory is therefore shaped to
respond to the strong sense of place and sense of nostalgia
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for the predisaster period. An active disaster-forgetting
process is in place at the national level in order to
encourage psychological recovery and economic develop-
ment. Although the presence of the volcano is beneficial
for tourism in the short term according to local policy-
makers and business owners, absencing the risk of disaster
provides a sense of safety and stability in order to
encourage investments and population growth. Yet
absencing may prevent benefiting from the memory of the
disaster to promote longer-term objectives of disaster risk
reduction, via the reduction of vulnerability.
5 Conclusion
The recovery process is largely marked by the evolution of
collective narratives about the past volcano disaster and the
persisting risks. Remembering and forgetting have a strong
influence on risk perception and hence on the willingness
and ability of society to adopt informed preparedness
measures. Less than a decade after the last volcanic activity
in Montserrat, the disaster has become fully part of the
identity of Montserrat, partly because of important efforts
of memorialization. Memory construction, through the
balance of reminded and forgotten elements, translates into
a recovery process where different post-disaster needs may
oppose each other.
In the case of Montserrat, memory construction is
mainly led by the need for stability and certainty that has
been generated by the extended and unfinished period of
disruption. In this context, collective memory mainly
anchors the disaster in the past rather than remind about the
persistence of risk in the present and, therefore, about the
need for knowledge transmission and risk communication.
The search for stability and certainty, led by fatigue and the
uncertainty of the occurrence of volcanic hazards,
encourages the absencing of risks within collective narra-
tives. This has crucial implications for the organic con-
struction of memory in the sense that it makes
remembering more vulnerable to fading and forgetting,
especially in a context of rapid demographic changes. Post-
disaster migrations and population ageing may indeed
amplify and accelerate the forgetting process unless there
are clear efforts to support risk communication and risk
awareness. The learning process during the post-disaster
recovery period is therefore largely affected by the active
efforts for forgetting elements of the disaster and of risks,
and by the natural evolution of memory. Forgetting may
contribute to explain the reproduction of drivers of vul-
nerability despite a recent experience of disaster.
This research provides an important contribution about
the role of memory and active forgetting about disaster
during the critical post-disaster recovery process. While
collective narratives contribute to how risk of disaster is
understood, contributing to the transmission of knowledge
and experience, risk perception and narratives themselves
affect the construction of memory and its translation at the
collective level. An essential question is whether there is a
way to respect the recovery, and the image of recovery,
while preserving preparedness for future possible activity.
This research enables a better understanding of the motives
for change and the obstacles and challenges for learning
from a disaster about how to reduce vulnerability. There
are therefore strong implications for making the post-dis-
aster period an effective time for learning from that disaster
crisis and preventing a reproduction of vulnerabilities.
Acknowledging that collective memory evolves and
transforms itself may encourage implementation of effec-
tive measures to preserve and share experiences and les-
sons across generations and social groups in a way that
supports increased disaster risk awareness. Moreover,
recognizing the dilemma faced by authorities and disaster
management agencies during a period with conflicting
needs, fatigue, and poor psychological recovery, may
encourage reframing of risk, and how to implement DRR
measures. During the post-disaster recovery process, the
collective unconscious effort to anchor the disaster in the
past may be necessary and must be acknowledged. In
practice, it may be useful to reframe how risk and disaster
are understood by policymakers and disaster management
agencies.
One of the highlighted challenges is how to remember
the potential hazards closer to the volcano, particularly in
those zones with low but finite risks from pyroclastic flows
that are or about to be reoccupied. Considering the crisis as
over (despite the ongoing status of the eruption) may allow
risk management to play a continuing role as part of
development strategies in the future. This strategy may
allow reinvestment in the areas that have been affected
(necessary for giving a sense of ‘‘normality’’), while
planning alternatives and increasing readiness for a future
eruption. This compromise includes, for instance, planning
evacuation routes, diversifying the response and recovery
resources (in and out of the exclusion zone), and locating
strategic infrastructure in safe areas.
Although this study does not give tangible solutions for
disaster risk reduction in a post-disaster context, it pro-
motes the acknowledgement of potential challenges for
learning from a disaster, and hence increases the ability to
counteract those obstacles. Because this study has focused
on the case of volcanic hazards, specifically because of
their high level of uncertainty and unpredictability, it
would be interesting to pursue the study in a context where
hazards occur more regularly in order to explore how
remembering and forgetting efforts differ and how they are
motivated. Such investigation also needs to be associated
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with research on effective risk communication and pre-
paredness in post-disaster contexts.
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